The U.S. Congress established the foundation of today’s surveillance state nearly a half century ago as it sought to regulate and prevent criminal activity: the Banking Secrecy Act to target tax evasion by individuals and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to create oversight of wiretapping activities by law enforcement. Over time, additional functions were layered onto the existing institutional infrastructure, such as combating illicit drugs. September 11th, 2001 served as a critical juncture, reorienting the regime yet again to support the counter terror mission, despite persistent inefficiency and simultaneous risks to the civil liberties of Americans.
- “Peace Dividends: President Eisenhower and the Unbuilding of the American National Security State” with Andrew J. Polsky in The Eisenhower Presidency: Lessons for the Twenty-First Century. 2015. Lexington Books.
In the post-war United States, a permanent national security state has been created. It is expensive and complex, comprised of everything from the nation’s conventional military forces to expensive weapons programs and intelligence operations. At the end of wars, Congress has influence over the size of the national security state, but the president determines its trajectory. By analyzing federal spending for the Department of Defense, I argue that presidents prioritize certain types of cuts, such as a reduction of force structure, to meet their long-term goals. But to implement further reductions, a president must overcome opposition from subordinates, in the military as well as Congress. President Eisenhower did this in the 1950s by innovating; he implemented new policies, embraced new solutions to old policy problems, and adopted suggested alternatives by others in order to secure greater reductions in defense spending.
- “Unchained Succubus: A Queer New Institutional Analysis of U.S. Supreme Court Nomination Hearings,” Politics & Gender 13, no. 4. December 2017, p. 683-709.
Modern Supreme Court nomination hearings are contentious political events, as evidenced by the four held during the 109th and 111th Congresses to confirm John Roberts, Samuel Alito, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Senators appear to purposely raise suspicion of nominees through their questioning during Judiciary Committee hearings, connecting the label of “judicial restraint” with candidates who are men, white, straight, and prone to “reason.” This is contrasted by appointees thought to embody the feminine, non-white, queer, and emotional practices of “judicial activism.” This dichotomous construction has made debates during the nomination process destructively reductive. A paradox thus emerges: by ignoring the importance of descriptive representation, the identity of potential justices to the Supreme Court becomes one of the most salient issues during the hearings; subsequently, this has resulted in senators using cues to create a caricature or “straw man” of nominees belonging to one or more minority groups in order to weaken and discredit otherwise qualified jurists and achieve a party “win” against the White House.